Introduction
The term "post-Ottoman space" seems to be unproblematic: places that had been part of the Ottoman Empire, but then ceased to be so. Yet the matter is hardly simple. Th e Ottoman Empire, like many other polities, expanded and then contracted. Th us Pecs, Hungary, and for that matter, Budapest, which were within the Ottoman Empire at its farthest reaches in central Europe in the late seventeenth century, should be considered as much post-Ottoman space as the Balkan territories that were the last to be "liberated, " in 1912, even though Ottoman rule in Hungary and Croatia ended more than two centuries earlier than it did in Macedonia and Albania. At the other extreme, we cannot speak of "Ottoman space" before there was at least an Ottoman state, if not yet empire. Th is means that we must look at the varieties of transformations of the fi rst Ottoman capital, Bursa, over a very long period-from 1326 until the end of Ottoman rule there, fi rst by the Greek occupation in 1920-22, then by the achievement of control there by the forces of the new Turkish state, as well as the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and the founding of the Republic in 1923. Th ere was not simply an Ottoman Empire and then post-Ottoman period, even in that one city. Th e variations in historical periods, national groups, and other elements of Ottoman history are at least as complex as those of any other major empire, so looking for commonalities in the making and unmaking of space as "Ottoman" from Budapest to Basra, and from Sarajevo to Kars, would seem an impossible task, even were we not to consider the historical trajectory of a single place, like Bursa from 1326 through 1923.
Yet there was a common way of marking a territory as Ottoman, from the very start of the Empire. From the founder of the dynasty, Osman, through the last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed VI, the Ottoman ruler was a Muslim and the Ottoman state was grounded on Islam. Th is was nothing unusual, of course. From the very beginning of Islam, Muslims confronted Byzantium, and Muslim leaders who became rulers did so by conquering territories ruled until then by Christians (Evans and Ratliff 2012) . Th e Christian populations did not disappear, but they were subordinated to Muslims, and this subordination took the form of, among other things, imposing physical signs of the superiority of Islam on landscapes that had until then been marked by signs of the superiority of Christianity. With the weakening or collapse of Ottoman authority in various regions of the Balkans, as shown below, these markers of Muslim dominance were supplanted by markers of Christian dominance. Th is means that there were common ways of marking territory that became Ottoman, on the one hand, and post-Ottoman, on the other, refl ecting the fact that the Christian and Muslim populations were engaged in what a Bulgarian historian, analyzing four hundred years of interaction between Muslims and Christians at key religious sites in the former Bulgarian capital of Veliko Tarnovo, calls "mutual provocation" (Parveva 2002: 52) , a pattern of interaction that my colleagues and I have defi ned more generally as "antagonistic tolerance" (Hayden 2002) , explained below.
Other chapters in this volume examine forms of diff erence such as gender and class, rather than religion, and Rebecca Bryant in her introduction reminds us of Karen Barkey's argument that the Ottoman Empire valued diff erences. Bryant also notes that the extent to which religious distinctions mattered in daily life "diff ered between village and town, between center and periphery, and between diff erent periods of Ottoman rule" (this volume, p. 13 ). Yet it is necessary to recall that there was a hierarchy of statuses, using the model of hierarchy proposed by Louis Dumont and recently reinvigorated by Joel Robbins, in which the superior value encompasses the inferior one (Dumont 1980; Robbins and Siikala 2014) . In the Ottoman Empire and in post-Ottoman spaces, the religious identity was superior to the others, in that each of these others was encompassed within it. For example, a woman would rarely be seen as only that, but would of necessity be regarded by others, and regard herself, as a Muslim woman, or a Christian one, or a Jewish one, to give major classifi cations; there are other possibilities within these larger categories (Baumgarten 2008; Green 2008) . Similarly, peasants were not just a single category of tax-paying common people; they were also grouped as Muslims or alternatively, as various specifi ed others, who were subject to taxes not imposed on Muslims. While patterns of interaction varied between city and countryside, this seems also to have involved individuals dealing with each other as members of religious communities. Minority communities sometimes had greater autonomy in the countryside than in cities, but their autonomy was tenuous since there could still be overriding involvement from the metropolitan center (Catlos 2014) .
Diff erences between members of diff erent religious communities in formerly Ottoman spaces were and are marked by names, some food prohibitions, following diff erent ritual calendars, and overwhelmingly, endogamous marriages. In this last category, while Muslim men could take non-Muslim women as wives, the reverse was not true. Furthermore, conversion could only be into Islam, conversion from Islam being strongly negatively sanctioned. Focusing on the changing formations of religious dominance is thus not only a way to identify Ottoman and post-Ottoman spaces, but also to identify a primary social category that encompassed other elements of identity, which were subordinated to religious identity.
Of course, recognizing the importance of the categories of religious identities reinforced in multiple ways is not to assert that there is some essential quality to any of them, but rather only to recognize the importance of social phenomena: people themselves used these categories, apparently believing in their validity even as they may often have adopted cultural practices from each other. In this regard, I must question the position asserted in some other chapters in this volume, that the borders between the religious communities were "blurred" when members identifying themselves as belonging to diff erent religions interacted. A leading researcher in the fi eld summed up the fi ndings of a volume on sharing religious sites in the Mediterranean by saying that "while the hybrid practices are striking, mixing with individuals of a diff erent religion does not result, so to speak, in any evident damage to existing religious identities. Indeed, these 'transgressions' usually appear to be associated with the original religious polarization" (Albera 2012: 243) . Such continued "polarizations" are a common fi nding of researchers on sites shared by members of diff erent religious communities.
Sharing of sites does not mean sharing of identity. I am reminded of the Ottoman-era tombstones exhibited inside a Bulgarian museum that in situ had shown Muslim names in the Arabic script above ground, but also carried crosses with Christian names, in Cyrillic, below ground, both names referring to the same person. Even obvious syncretism does not lead to shared identities. Observational studies of Christians and Muslims at shrines frequently attended by members of both groups have been very clear: from Hasluck in 1913 through very recent studies in Bulgaria nearly a century later, members of these communities maintain their separate religious identities, and avoid engaging in some of the characteristic forms of worship of the other religion. As one recent study put it, at sites in which members of two or more religious communities interact, " [c] ooperation between believers from diff erent religious traditions should not be mistaken for religious syncretism. Deep down, this … is a cultural strategy developed by members of both groups for anti-syncretic purposes, that is to preserve the religious autonomy of each group" (Lubanska 2013: 107) . We have no reason to believe that such strategies were diff erent in the Ottoman period.
If we pay attention to the processes of marking and unmarking Ottoman space through manifestations of dominance of Islam or Christianity, we are forced to consider the circumstances under which they take place, and thus also the trajectories of relations between the religious communities. Seen in this light, "peaceful coexistence" is not so much a condition that can be disrupted, as a manifestation of relations at times when the dominance of one group over another is so fi rmly established that it need not be imposed, and cannot be much countered. By focusing on the physical forms used to mark dominance, we can also trace the trajectories of domination and its decline, and thus of periods of peaceful interaction with those of contestation.
Marking and Unmarking Space as Ottoman
Let us begin with the very start of Ottoman rule in Bursa. Osman died two years before Bursa was captured, but his son and successor Orhan had him buried in the most prominent building of the formerly Christian town, the "silver dome" of a monastery complex (Çağaptay 2011: 52-53) . Upon his own death, Orhan was buried in the main church of the same complex (Ibid.). Çağaptay argues that the early Ottomans thereby "transferred the confessional loci" in the city by adapting these Byzantine religious structures into their developing Ottoman design. In so doing, she argues, the Ottomans were demonstrating conquest and power, but also incorporation of Christian elements into their empire (Çağaptay 2011: 64-65) . Th us we have apparent syncretism, but in an eff ort to persuade Christians to accept the legitimacy of Muslim rule and even, possibly, emphasize the continuity of Islam with Christianity.
Such appropriation of the most prominent Christian structures was a common feature of Ottoman conquest, as seen at Constantinople in 1453, Belgrade in 1521, and Pecs in 1545. In all of these cases, literally the fi rst action of the conquering Ottoman (Mehmet II in Constantinople, Suleyman in Belgrade and Pecs) was to convert the largest church into a mosque. Th ereafter, in all of these cases, the city soon came to be dominated by mosques and other structures associated with Islam, and in ways that quite literally imposed Muslim dominance on the cities.
Th e early Ottoman development of Bursa has recently been studied using advanced geo-spatial technologies. Employing GIS data and various mapping techniques, a Turkish-Japanese research team found that the fi rst Ottoman mosques were placed so as to maximize their visibility throughout the city. Th ese researchers suggest that the Ottoman emperors controlled the city through the strategic placement of mosques in what had been a Christian city (Dostoğlu et al. 2004) . A later publication by members of the same team argued that not only was one of the largest mosques built on a site of high visibility, but that after the mosque was built the road network was altered to increase the mosque's visibility even further ).
Çağaptay sees the transformation of Bursa as a model for later Ottoman adaptations of conquered Christian towns, in the region and beyond. Another tendency was to build outward from the old town in ways that were more clearly Muslim in origin and did not connect to the Byzantine past. In fact, Bursa's contested history continued: the Greek army conquered it in the invasion of 1920 and held it as their headquarters until their defeat and withdrawal in 1922. We know that they reconverted Byzantine churches that had been converted into mosques in nearby towns such as Trilye/Triglia and Iznik/Nicea, but we do not have details of those conversions, which were in any event reversed after not only the Greek army but the Christian civilian population was driven out in 1922-23 (Hayden et al. 2011) . Remarkably, however, in October 2012, renovations in the Muradiye Mosque (1426) in Bursa revealed blue stencils of Greek fl ags under the whitewash, obviously from the time of Greek rule in 1920-22, but unknown until now (personal communication from Dr. Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir, 13 October 2012). Th ese Greek national icons indicate that the Greeks converted the mosque to their own use at that time.
Since marking a space as Ottoman involved imposing a Muslim identity on major Christian structures within it, and then expanding the visibility of Islamic structures in a town, the reverse process also held true: de-Ottomanization (at least outside the territory of today's Turkey) was marked by replacing the dominance of Muslim structures by dominant Christian ones.
Th e case of Pecs is interesting. Th e Mosque of Kasim Pasha was built between 1543 and 1545 on the site of what had been St. Bartholomew's Church and using the stones of that church, but was (re)converted into a Catholic church when the Ottomans were forced from Pecs, and remains such today (Bachmann and Bachman 2010) . Th is was hardly an unusual case. In Belgrade, following the 1521 Ottoman conquest, every church was destroyed or converted until the Hungarians took the place in 1688 and then all mosques were converted or destroyed. After the Ottomans took it again in 1690 they repaired the damaged mosques and built a new one; but when the Austrians took the city in 1717 they promptly destroyed the mosques or converted them. Th e Ottomans returned in 1739 and again tore down churches while setting up mosques; the third Austrian occupation from 1789 to 1791, again saw the destruction or conversion of mosques, until the fi nal Ottoman conquest of Belgrade in 1791 led, again, to the repair of mosques and the destruction of churches. Among the very fi rst actions taken by Karađorđe, the leader of the First Serbian Uprising, when his troops took control of Belgrade in 1806, was to convert the largest mosque into an Orthodox church. While that uprising was suppressed in 1813, with Belgrade retaken and the church reconverted into a mosque, with the establishment of the Serbian principality in 1830 the power of the Ottomans was in decline, so that when they were fi nally forced to abandon Belgrade in 1867, only one small mosque remained in operation, and remains so today (on all of this history, see Hayden 2005) .
Sofi a, Bulgaria, saw a history similar to that of Belgrade, with the Ottomans destroying churches or converting them into mosques, and the newly liberated Bulgarian state destroying mosques or converting them into Bulgarian Orthodox churches (Hayden et al. 2011) . Such cycles of destruction/conversion/reconversion were not limited to capitals. One of my favorite examples is the present-day Church of the Resurrected Christ in Čačak, Serbia. Th e church still has visible signs of its last incarnation as a mosque between 1738 and 1805; but between 1560, when the fi rst mosque was built on the site by destroying a church there, until 1738, the town changed hands numerous times and the building went through several cycles of transformation from mosque to church and back again (Rajić and Timotijević 2011) .
What marked a space as Ottoman, then, was the imposition of Muslim religious structures in primary locations in the town or city concerned, while marking it as no longer Ottoman involved displacing these Muslim structures with Christian ones. Th is does not mean that, in either case, all of the religious structures of the group that was suddenly subordinated would be transformed or destroyed. On the contrary, we know that very soon after taking Constantinople, Mehmet II issued orders giving rights to the remaining Greek population and protecting many of their churches (Inalcik 1969/70) , and even though the Hagia Sophia was immediately converted into a mosque, some of the Christian iconography on the walls remained for decades afterwards (Necipoğlu 1992) . One small Byzantine church in Istanbul, St. Mary of the Mongols, was never converted and remains functioning as a Greek Orthodox church. Similarly, in Belgrade and Sofi a, there are still functioning Ottoman-era mosques, albeit small ones. In Triglea/Trilye, already mentioned, the Ottomans did indeed convert the largest of the Byzantine churches there into a mosque in the sixteenth century, but fi ve other large churches remained functioning in a town that was overwhelmingly majority Christian until the "population exchange" of 1923 forced the Christian population to leave for Greece (Hayden et al. 2011) .
Being marked by the Ottoman conquest in all of these places was Muslim dominance over Christianity; this was the primary indicator that a space was indeed Ottoman. And when a territory was brought out of Ottoman rule, the physical markers of Muslim dominance-mosques, minarets, türbes, and other structures-were destroyed or displaced by more prominent Christian structures: churches, bell towers, and the like (see, e.g., Mišković 2011 on the transformations of urban space in Belgrade during the transition from Ottoman to Serbian national rule). Th is form of marking was constant, from the beginning of the empire until past its end, and this consistency through time provides a means to analyze the coexistence of the religious communities in the Ottoman period, by considering the physical structures associated with each: their distribution through time, and their features as indicators of dominance. Th ese are brought together in the concept of religioscape, the distribution in spaces through time of the physical manifestations of specifi c religious traditions and of the populations that build them, as explained below. First, however, it is necessary to consider what we mean by saying that space is "shared, " peacefully and less so.
Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing, Dominance and Intertemporal Violence
My analysis diff ers from that of others in this volume because it draws on concepts developed in the course of a fi ve-year, multi-disciplinary, and comparative research project on competitive sharing of religious sites, which my colleagues and I have carried out via fi eld research in Bulgaria, India, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, and Turkey, with substantial reference to library resources on other places (see Hayden 2002; Hayden et al. 2011; Hayden and Walker 2013; Hayden et al. 2016 ; and the website of the project, http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/antagonistictolerance/AT_Main_ Page.html). We have developed a model of "antagonistic tolerance" (hereafter, AT) to explain long-term patterns of relationship between members of groups who identify themselves and each other as Self and Other communities, diff erentiated primarily on the basis of religion, living intermingled but rarely intermarrying (Hayden 2002) . Th e religious distinction is often accompanied by other diff erences, such as in naming, kinship, diet, and perhaps preferred methods of gaining a livelihood. In this model, which was inspired by the work of F.W. Hasluck (1973 Hasluck ( [1929 ), contestation develops in a region in which one religious tradition is dominant when a community identifi ed with a diff ering religion arrives via trade or indigenous development. Th e AT model holds that in such situations, there is "tolerance" in the sense of enduring the presence of the other but not embracing it, so long as one group is clearly dominant over others. Such dominance is indicated in part by control of the primary identity of major religious sites. However, when existing dominance is threatened, violence results, and violence often accompanies the transformation of sites, which may hap-pen when one group replaces the dominant position previously held by another. Th e processes involved are long-term, though transformations may take place in short periods.
A key feature of this model is consideration of the dominance of one religious community over another, or over others, and of contestations for dominance; we do not regard religion as likely to be irrelevant politically in any situation in which large groups self-and Other-identify as diff erent communities. Religious dominance is marked by control over key religious sites, and the attainment of dominance leads to the transformation of such places. Th e transformation of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul from a church into a mosque, or the conversion of the great mosque of Cordoba into a church, are obvious examples; but the mosque in Cordoba stood in the place of the Gothic Christian church, which had replaced the Roman Christian one, which had replaced the Roman temple. It is important to note that, often, members of a subordinated community may visit religious sites claimed by the dominant one, and even perform some observances there. Syncretism may arise from such sharing, even though dominance of one group over the other is clear.
Th e AT pattern is also one of intertemporal violence, either at times when an existing structure of dominance of one group over others is threatened or when existing dominance has been overturned. We adapt the term intertemporal in part from economics, where it refers to dynamic decision making in regard to investment and consumption over the course of a period of time, so that the present state of, for example, an investment account is the result of a series of forward-looking decisions made at earlier times. In international and comparative law, intertemporality refers to the diff erences between the legal rules applied to a factual situation at an earlier time and those applied at the time of analysis, so that, for example, a decision granting ownership of property to a party at an earlier time is not ordinarily challengeable later on the grounds that the law changed ex post facto.
In the AT model, we envision relatively stable manifestations of dominance that are both adjusted and reinforced by changes attempted by the parties with greater or lesser success (drawing on the economic meaning of intertemporal) but also liable to sudden transformations when a change in dominance is eff ected (drawing on the legal meaning of intertemporal). Th us the model is akin to what biologists describe as punctuated equilibrium, as that term has been adopted for religious studies by Mark C. Taylor (2007: 27) : "periods of relative stability and gradual change are interrupted by phase shifts that lead to structural and morphological transformations. " Even then, in many cases, violence is likely to be only that which is necessary either to re-establish the ear-lier dominance or to put in place the dominance of another group. After that, relations between the communities involved may continue relatively peaceably for centuries (see, e.g., Hayden et al. 2011) .
Critics of the AT model generally disregard the intertemporality of social relations between members of religious communities, preferring instead to isolate specifi c brief periods in historical trajectories for analysis and largely ignoring what has occurred before and after. Th ey also analyze individual shrines as if they were isolated from other such sites, focusing on what they see as primarily local actors. Such analyses refl ect the traditional anthropological framing of imagining an ethnographic present and a locally delimited community. Yet they also manifest the conceptual weaknesses of structural-functionalism, presuming stasis in social relations among local communities and unable to deal with change except as disruption of this static condition by the intervention of outsiders.
Glenn Bowman's critique of the AT model through analysis of relations between members of diff erent Christian churches at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (Bowman 2011b) exemplifi es this tacit revival of structural functionalism. He posits an "existential consanguinity … when people live in relatively close proximity, engaging with each other in quotidian activities" except when this is disrupted by external religious leaders. He also says that "[e]ven manifestations of apparent hostility between local Christians of diff erent denominations, such as the ritualised 'fi ghts' which take place between Armenians and Greeks … are traditional charades played out between men who, on the street, are friends. " Since Radcliff e-Brown (1965: 179) defi ned the function of any recurring practice (here, the "ritual fi ghts") as the role it plays in maintaining the social structure (the "set of relations amongst unit entities, " here the "existential consanguinity" of local Christians), Bowman seems to have re-invented structural-functionalism. I understand the normative appeal of seeing interaction within shrines as being determined primarily by the traditions of sanctity that mark them as sacred to a local community that supposedly operates in harmony unless it is disrupted from the outside. However, to do so is to make the same mistake as the structural-functionalists did when they analyzed the inherently stabilizing eff ects in local communities of "tribal" institutions (e.g., kinship, law) without making reference to the institutions of the larger colonial states that set the parameters on what the natives could do.
At the same time, ignoring the intertemporality of social relations between members of diff erent religious communities also permits critics of the AT model to ignore the reality of these communities as corporate groups. Rogers Brubaker's dismissal of putative "groupism" has been used to criticize the AT model (Henig 2014 ), but it is diffi cult to deny that religious communities existed as corporate groups in the Ottoman and post-Ottoman period. Th at individuals act in the name of corporate groups hardly negates the importance of considering the group as a social actor, without assuming that the corporate group is internally homogenous or is composed of "unitary collective actors with common purposes" (Brubaker 2004) , though further discussion of Brubaker's model lies outside the scope of this chapter. Corporate groups, of course, are in principle immortal, so an intertemporal frame of reference is needed to accommodate their relevance before, and after, any particular ethnographic present, period of confl ict, or post-confl ict confi guration. By the same token, saying that the AT model sees periods of peaceful interaction as "only temporary" misses the point that we always anticipate change-neither peaceful interaction nor confl ict are permanent conditions, and in fact, we see the longer periods as being those of peaceful interaction.
I should also make clear our view of the connection between religion and violence. It has become popular in policy and political science circles to emphasize the diff ering worldviews of various religions, which by defi nition are at variance, to say that violence is inevitable between members of diff erent religions, and that confl ict at "contested" religious sites is inevitable, intractable, and impervious to a rational solution (Atran et al. 2007; Ginges et al. 2007; Hassner 2009; Atran and Ginges 2012) . In part this position rests on a confusion between the necessarily totalizing worldviews of religions, which tend to explain the world in toto, (i.e., without remainder), with the political reality of a modern totalitarian state (Bakić-Hayden 2002: 65-67) . In fact, among the latter, only a few attempts have been made to completely eradicate religion (in the name of socialism, with the possible exceptions of the early years of the USSR and of Albania among European socialist states) or even particular minority religions. Even the Islamic Republic of Iran tolerates Judaism and Christianity, albeit antagonistically, since demographically and otherwise the members of these communities do not pose any threat to it.
We see violence as likely only when dominance is under contention and must be either acquired or (re)inforced. We also do not see religion per se as inherently linked to violence, despite the fact that violence is present in many a holy book. Rather, religion may be the key identifying factor associated with a community and thus accepted as defi ning that group as opposed to others. Th e importance of such distinctions, while potentially strategic, are not static but may be subject to change with new circumstances, refl ecting their intertemporality. For example, Bowman (1993) has shown how Christian and Muslim Palestinians unite at a shrine shared by members of both groups in the face of oppression of both communities by the Israeli state, but that when Israeli occupation was briefl y lifted following the Oslo accords, the Muslims and Christians became much more opposed under the Muslim-dominated, and Muslim-favoring, governance of the PLO (Bowman 2001 ).
Shared Space: Overlapping Religioscapes and Indicators of Dominance
Th is brings us back to the nature of the "space" that we can call Ottoman or post-Ottoman, and how it was shared. In the AT model, we refer to groups that live intermingled, and our own initial conceptualization was of individual sites in localities (neighborhoods, towns) where members of diff erent groups may live in the same neighborhoods, or in adjacent neighborhoods. As our research progressed, however, we saw that it is better to view shared religious sites as nodes in structures of social interactions between populations that distinguish themselves and each other as diff erent, on religious grounds, through time. As a node, a single site is not isolable from the social networks that interact at it. Th us a Muslim site should be seen as linked to other Muslim sites, a Christian site to other Christian sites, and all at varying scales. Scale here may range from local communities to regional networks to those on a state or imperial scale, and even between states/empires. In our usage, "religioscape" refers to the distribution in spaces through time of the physical manifestations of specifi c religious traditions and of the populations that build them (Hayden and Walker 2013) . Both the population and the physical manifestations of the religion are components of a religioscape; a physical artifact associated with a religion that is no longer practiced may be evidence of a previous religioscape but does not itself constitute a religioscape. Religioscapes as we defi ne them are inherently fl uid: people move, taking their religious practices with them, and potentially change the built environment, too, in ways that refl ect their beliefs. Yet the religioscape also refl ects the connections between people who regard themselves as holding the same beliefs, or are regarded by others as doing so. Th e religioscape, then, is a social space marked by physical icons, from small shrines to large complexes of them, or even sacred cities. Indeed, complexes of places, or even territories, may be imbued with religious meaning.
Th e situations we are interested in are those in which two populations distinguished by diff ering religions inhabit the same territory. In such cases, their religioscapes intersect, and the power relations of the two groups will be displayed by features of the sites relative to each other. In our work, we have identifi ed two indexes of empirical indicators of dominance, centrality and perceptibility. Centrality refers to location within a settlement, or perhaps proximity to locations of important economic or political activities.
1 Perceptibility refers to features of a structure that make it more perceptible: height, mass, color, projection of sound are examples. In all cases, the greater the indicator, the higher the assertion of dominance. Th us a building that is more centrally located is likely to belong to the dominant community, as is a building that is taller, or broadcasts sound better, or is more colorful than a nearby building of another religious community. Centrality and perceptibility are co-relevant factors, meaning that a shrine may exhibit a combination of these attributes. A massive building with a high tower and amplifi ed sound in the center of a settlement would be dominant, but as these factors vary, dominance may be challenged. A primary fi nding of our comparative research, however, is that centrality is the key factor in indicating dominance. Th at is, a religious structure that is at a central location is presumed to refl ect dominance over shrines at less central positions.
We can give some concrete examples from spaces that were soon to be, or had just become, post-Ottoman. Let us start with one of the most important indicators of perceptibility, height. Building churches was generally prohibited in the Ottoman Empire, but it was possible to "repair" older ones. Even so, churches could not be as tall as mosques and were generally on the periphery of settlements that also contained mosques (Gradeva 1994) , and could not have bell towers; indeed, even clock towers were resisted by many Muslims in the late Ottoman period because they were said to resemble church bell towers (Uluengin 2010) . When the Ottoman Empire was losing its ability to govern in Bosnia and tried to appease the Serbian population in Sarajevo by permitting the construction of a large Orthodox church, the dedication of the church (1872) was protected by 1,200 Ottoman troops, with cannon positioned to bombard the city should trouble break out from among the local Muslims, who were protesting not only against the construction of the church, but especially against its having a bell tower (Donia 2006: 33-35) . Among the fi rst actions taken after the end of Ottoman rule in 1878 in both Bosnia and Bulgaria was that bell towers were added to churches, as can be seen in the old Serbian church in Sarajevo (sv. Arhanđela Mihaila i Gavrila) and the 1859 cathedral in Plovdiv (sv. Bogoroditsa), both of which received bell towers in 1880. Another example from northeastern Bulgaria: near the center of the town of Suvorovo in northern Bulgaria, a mid-nineteenth century church faces a sixteenth-century mosque. Th e town now has a Christian majority, though it had a Muslim majority under Ottoman rule. Th e minaret of the mosque is taller than the bell tower of the church-but the minaret is topped by a cross, an unusual feature (to say the least!) that both Christians and Muslims will point out to visitors. Close-up pictures reveal that what looks like a cross from the ground is actually a fl eur de lis, quite an ambiguous symbol, and while doubtless most townspeople know this, the general acceptance of the icon as a cross acknowledges the local supremacy of the Christian population of the town.
Th e interplay between centrality and perceptibility can be seen in Plovdiv (Turkish: Filibe), Bulgaria, a former capital city and one of the fi rst parts of Bulgaria conquered by the Ottomans. Th e main Friday mosque, the Muradiye, built apparently in the 1420s (Boykov 2009), 2 is in the center of the Ottoman town and actually the center of the place since the Roman period: the mosque perches literally on the edge of a Roman amphitheater. Almost due east, up a hill via ulitsa Saborna (Cathedral St.) , is the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God (sv. Bogoroditsa), an 1850s church with a bell tower added in 1880, two years after Ottoman rule ended. Th e church is large, and taller than the mosque, but it is removed from the center of the town. Even then, looking back at the mosque, one sees that the minaret is at the same level as the church, and until an earthquake in 1928, the minaret was actually higher than the roof of the church-which makes the erection of the bell tower, even taller than that, very understandable.
Other evidence on the importance of centrality can be seen in Razgrad, also in northeastern Bulgaria, and still the center of one of the few remaining concentrations of Turks in Bulgaria (Sözer 2012) . Th e sixteenth-century Ibrahim Pasha Mosque, one of the largest mosques in the Balkans, is in the center of town. As of 2008, the mosque had been closed for decades, which means that even though it is in the center of the town, that center is denied to the Muslims, as sacred space; they are limited to using a much smaller mosque outside the city center (Hande Sözer, personal communication, 14 November 2012; see also Keil 1991) . Meanwhile, the 1860 St. Nicholas Church, on the outskirts of the town when it was built (presumably without a bell tower), was massively reconstructed (and a bell tower added) after the offi cial independence of Bulgaria, and again immediately after the fall of communism. Since the town center is denied to the dominant Christian community (the Ibrahim Pasha Mosque being too large and well-known to permit its destruction), the Muslims are denied use of it as well. Dominance, though, is local, as can be seen in the one region of Bulgaria in which ethnic Turks form a majority, around Kardjali/Karcali (see Sözer 2012) . Th e town itself is under the political control of the main Turkish political party in Bulgaria, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi] , and is one of the very few towns in Bulgaria in which an Orthodox church is not located in the center, but there is a mosque there. In the nearby town of Benkovski, which has an almost exclusively Muslim population, is not only one of the oldest mosques in the region (recently renovated as of 2008) but also one of very few, if not the only, churches from the Tanzimat period that is abandoned. When we saw it in July 2008, not only was the church empty (though it did bear a sign saying it would be renovated), but the church yard was being used to dry tobacco, the local cash crop. Th is empty church would not be so surprising were it not for the fact that so much eff ort and money has been put into renovating other churches from the period, which are often referred to as "liberation churches" and are seen as having been central to the Bulgarian national movement in the nineteenth century. Indeed, a mural from the 1950s in the Plovdiv Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God depicts a Turk whipping a crying woman, a city dweller, and a priest, all in chains and at the head of a column of other Bulgarians, with the title of "the church and the nation in the struggle for liberation. " Th us the local dominance of the Turks in Kardjali lets them maintain mosques in the center of towns there, but they are on the south-eastern periphery (the Greek border) of a postsocialist Bulgaria defi ned very much in terms of its Orthodox Christian heritage-with St. Ivan Rilski, carrying a cross, appearing on the one-lev coin in use in the post-communist period.
By evaluating the nodes of religioscapes in accordance with the indicators of centrality and perceptibility, we can get a very good picture of which group is dominant at any given moment in time for which we can obtain the relevant data; and by looking at the changing nodes of religioscapes through time, we can assess the development of dominance by religiously-defi ned groups as well. To give the simplest of examples, a map of religious sites in Sofi a shortly before 1878 would have indicated two small Orthodox churches near the Market Mosque and the Banya Başı Mosque, much smaller and lower than either of them; an 1867 stone church without a bell tower (St. Nedelya) nearby; slightly farther way and on a hill was the sixth-century St. Sophia Church for which the city was named but had been converted into a mosque; and there was also a large mosque on another nearby hill, the Kara Camii (Black Mosque). In terms of our indicators, the Muslim religioscape shows dominance: the mosques were all larger than the churches, and on higher ground. However, a map today would show the reverse: the two small Christian churches remain, but the former Market Mosque is now the Museum of the Archeological Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the former Black Mosque has been transformed into the Church of the Forty Martyrs, the St. Sophia church is once again a church, and there is a larger St. Nedelya, erected in 1933 to replace the earlier one (which had gotten a bell tower in 1879), plus the second-largest cathedral in the Balkans, the Aleksander Nevsky Cathedral, planned in 1888 and built in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, on a point even higher than St. Sophia and the Forty Martyrs Church. Th e Muslim religoscape still exists, but is much reduced in size, and the remaining nodes on it are dominated by the nodes of the Orthodox Christian religioscape, in terms of height, elevation, size and amplifi cation of sound. On this last point, the churches have bell towers, but the mosque is not permitted to amplify the call to prayer.
Intersecting Religioscapes
Most intriguing, perhaps, are those situations in which two religioscapes intersect, in that a single site is claimed as a node on each of them. Saints' shrines are common places of such overlap, from India (where a saint may have both a Hindu identity and a Muslim one, and be venerated as such by members of each group [Hayden 2002] ) through the Balkans and indeed, the wider Mediterranean world (see Albera and Couroucli 2012; Bowman 2012) . Th e AT model anticipates such intersections, drawing on Hasluck's analysis that "ambiguous shrines, " those shared by members of more than one religion, represented a "period of equipoise" in the relations of power between them. To us, what is most interesting is to analyze the trajectories of the development of the diff ering religioscapes that can turn a site from belonging to one group, through the period of equipoise when it is also claimed by another, to perhaps a stage in which the fi rst group has been largely displaced.
Such a site can be seen in Obrochishte, in northeastern Bulgaria, in what was clearly built as the türbe of a Muslim saint and has long been identifi ed as the tomb of the saint Ak-yazul Baba. Th e site has been a museum since at least the communist period, and a booklet from the time (Маrgos n.d.) presents a straightforward archaeological and historical analysis of the site, as having been built in the sixteenth century and being similar in design to other türbes in the region. Th ere was also a dervish connection: the site has not only the tomb (türbe) but also an additional building which Margos (n.d.) identifi es as an imaret (soup kitchen) or a tekke. Th e latter seems more likely, since Margos reports that in 1884 (thus six years after Bulgarian independence) a Czech historian visited the site and found one remaining dervish. It is also possible that the site was Alevi or Bektashi, and the second building a cem hall, though, as Hande Sözer (2012) has shown, the Alevi presence among Bulgarian Turks often passes unnoticed.
In any event, there seems little reason to doubt that the site was built for the use of Muslims, during the Ottoman period. By the time of our visit in 2008, however, while the site was still offi cially a museum, the usual internal trappings of the türbe of a sufi saint were accompanied by Christian icons, as well as by crosses, 3 and the site was identifi ed by the museum employee on duty as actually being that of a Christian saint, Atanas, the "good friend" of Ak-yazul Baba, rather than of the Baba himself. In fact, the identities of the saint(s) were merged in the telling, with the ultimate climax of the story being that Atanas had been so unfortunate as to fall in love with a Muslim woman, something that was prohibited and thus led to his execution. Ak-yazul Baba, heartbroken, knew that to build a tomb for his friend would not be permitted by the Ottoman rulers, so in one night he built the türbe, saying it was a tomb for himself, but actually burying Atanas there and then leaving the place.
Th e website of the museum, now called the "Monastery of Akyazala Baba-St. Atanas, " 4 does not tell this story but refers to the place as "Th e bi-ritual prayer house of the Muslim saint Akyazala Baba and of his Christian counterpart St. Athanasius, " in contrast to the booklet from the communist period, which referred only to the Baba. Th e website identifi es the site as having been built as a Bektashi tomb in the sixteenth century but that in the late nineteenth century it became a "biritual sanctuary" visited by Muslims and Christians, presumably following Bulgarian liberation from Ottoman rule in 1878. Th e website notes that Christians believe that there had been a monastery at the site before the Muslims came and turned the monastery into a Dervish lodge/tekke, a claim made of many other tekkes in the Balkans and Anatolia. Th e website, which is in English as well as Bulgarian, is thus more reserved than the Bulgarian-speaking museum employee whom we met in 2008, who presented the site as the tomb of the Christian, St. Atanas, telling the story related above.
In terms of the balance between the religious communities, in this part of Bulgaria Muslims have almost vanished, and the site is increasingly visited by Orthodox Christians, not only Bulgarian but also Russian and Romanian (whose border is only about forty kilometers distant). In May 2009, a "folklore fair-St. Anasthasius" was held at the site for the fi rst time.
5 Th e site thus seems to be at a stage of transformation that is likely to turn it into a predominantly Christian shrine, just as Hasluck's model, and ours, would predict. We note that this transformation is taking place in the context of a democratic Bulgaria, a member of the European Union and, thus, presumably dedicated to minority rights, comprehensive religious freedoms, and cultural preservation. Th e museum is facilitating this change.
Other cases of intersecting religoscapes have been presented by perhaps the most persistent critic of the AT model, Glenn Bowman. He and other scholars have done an excellent job of providing detailed ethnography, including a short book with a separate analysis of certain shrines along with professional photographs (Koneska and Jankuloski 2009) and accompanying fi lm (Koneska 2009 ). Th ose correspond to and document further sites in Macedonia that Bowman has presented in several publications (Bowman 2010 (Bowman , 2012b and as the cover photograph of an edited book (Bowman 2012) . We focus on the Sveti Nikola church in Makedonski Brod, Macedonia, which "contains the turbe (tomb) of a Bektashi saint, Hadir Bābā, " and which is visited by members of other Sufi orders as well as by Sunni Muslims. Th e Christians also hold rituals there. Th e place shows very interesting forms of syncretism: various pictures show Muslims praying and, in the background, there are icons of Orthodox Christian saints, and another icon of an Orthodox saint is on the very grave of the Bektashi saint to which they are praying. Th e fl at stone marking the grave, covered by a green cloth, is used by the Christians as a table for their icon and off erings during their rituals. Several striking photographs in the Koneska and Jankuloski volume show Bektashi and Helveti Muslims praying (separately) toward the grave, which has on top of it an Orthodox icon of St. George. Bowman also notes that a Sufi prayed towards the iconostasis that the Orthodox added to the building, thus towards the Christian altar, rather than toward the grave of the saint.
Bowman interprets all of this as a form of "mixing" that is actually a symbiotic "sharing" (Bowman's quotes) of the shrine (Bowman 2010: 202) , and refl ects "an institutional and personal openness on the part of Orthodox caretakers towards the presence of Muslim 'others'" (Bowman 2010: 203) . However, this ignores the main factor of the AT model: dominance. We have argued that when one group is clearly dominant over another, the subordinated group may be permitted to attend the shrines of the dominant group. Th is fi ts perfectly the site of the St. Nicholas church in Makedonski Brod: the population of the town is now almost completely Orthodox Christian, so dominance of that group is not threatened, and the building is clearly controlled by the Christians. Th ey determine when the Muslims can utilize the place, and the appropriation of the stone covering the grave of the Bektashi saint to serve as a table for Christian services, even when the Muslims are conducting their own rituals, is a striking manifestation of dominance. Furthermore, de-spite the presence of elements of each others' iconography in the building, there is no evidence that the Muslims regard themselves as anything other than, severally, Bektashi, Halveti, and Sunni Muslims, nor are the Christians in doubt as to their identity as Macedonian Orthodox Christians; none of these identities is in question, and neither are they in any way mixed, shared, or mingled. Koneska's essay (2009) and fi lm make these separations literally visible, especially in the original, Macedonian, version of the bilingual text, and in the spoken Macedonian heard in the fi lm.
Th e importance of both the trajectory of events and the scale of relevant religioscapes can be seen by revisiting Bowman's citation of Hasluck for the proposition that Orthodox Christians rarely if indeed ever convert mosques into churches unless the site had previously been a church (Bowman 2010: 217n13) . Hasluck did his fi eldwork before World War I, while the Ottoman Empire was still in existence. After fi nal Bulgarian independence in 1908, and the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Macedonia in 1912, Orthodox Christians did indeed convert some mosques into churches, including those in Sofi a and Uzundzhovo Bulgaria (Hayden et al. 2011) . Heath Lowry (2009: 61-93 ) describes several more such transformations in northern Greece, and notes that this process is understudied. Th e trajectory of events following the demise of the Ottoman Empire changed the possibilities for contesting dominance between Christians and Muslims, and this change in possibility had local eff ects but on a large scale. Hasluck's early twentieth-century ethnography thus refl ected the structure of dominance of Muslims over Christians in the late Ottoman period but not those in post-Ottoman space, and cannot be taken as evidence of an Orthodox Christian aversion to converting Muslim shrines.
What we fi nd most lacking in ethnographic accounts of interaction that seems non-confl ictual is serious consideration of the trajectories of events that set up the systems of dominance that, in our model, allow for such peaceful situations. We believe that the more fully developed approach to competitive sharing put forth in this article should serve to clarify that both long periods of peaceful interaction as well as brief ones of violence can be explained by the AT model, which identifi es the conditions that promote both.
Contiguous Religioscapes as Demarcating Borders
Historical processes may lead to the physical separation of religious communities that had been living intermingled, peacefully through voluntary processes of migration, or violently and suddenly through the processes formerly called "population exchanges" and now called "ethnic cleansing. " In such cases, what had been nodes in religioscapes may be abandoned, destroyed, or transformed into nodes in the religioscape of the other group. Th is last form of transformation may be exemplifi ed by the sixteenth-century mosque in Uzhundzhovo, Bulgaria, that since 1908 has been an Orthodox Church (Hayden et al. 2011) , or the mid-nineteenth-century Orthodox church in Derinkuyu, Turkey, that since 1949 has been the Republican Mosque (Tanyeri-Erdemir et al. 2014) . As for sites abandoned or destroyed, we may recall many Orthodox churches in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, or many Islamic ones in the Republic of Cyprus; or mosques in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia after 1992, and Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo after 1999. In such cases, the religioscapes no longer overlap, and they are unlikely to intersect. Th ey are instead contiguous, marking the frontiers of territories that have been partitioned. Th e territorial spaces marked by such borders need not be coterminous with state or political borders, though they may become so through time.
We would argue that careful examination of the sites that actually remain in use by members of a minority religious community may reveal aspects of inter-communal interactions that may otherwise go unnoticed. For example, while most people in Belgrade know that there are two türbes in the oldest part of the city, I have observed that these are used as saint shrines by local Muslims, who seek blessings and favor at them. Th is use is unknown to my colleagues at Belgrade University, even though one türbe is directly across the park from the building that houses the Departments of Anthropology and Archaeology, but it means that the Muslim archaeoscape of Belgrade still has more nodes than might be expected.
Sometimes such a more or less covert use of part of a site that has otherwise been lost to a religious group may indicate that there are more intergroup activities going on than may be recognized at the level of public politics. Two such sites may be seen in northern Cyprus, in places that were major Orthodox Christian sites but from which the Christians were driven away in 1974: the Monastery of St. Barnabus (Famagusta) and the Church of St. Mamas (Morphou). In both cases, the churches were turned into museums. Yet visits to them in October 2011 revealed the renewed presence of Orthodox Christians. 6 At St. Barnabus, the monastery remains a museum, but the tomb of the saint is lit by votive candles, and has icons and symbolic off erings (dolls representing hoped-for babies, eye symbols for the return of sight) that indicate that the Orthodox faithful, and probably others, are coming there. As for St.
Mamas, the church looks as though it is ready for a liturgy at any time: the iconostasis is in place, as is the altar behind it, and the altar has all of the necessary equipment. And it turns out that the Bishop of Morphou has been able to hold occasional services in the church, beginning in 2004, thirty years after he and his fl ock were driven out of the town. It seems that these sites, though offi cially secularized and thus no longer part of any religioscape, may be serving to make the Orthodox Christian religioscape in Cyprus overlap again with that Muslim one, and possibly even to make them intersect, since Muslims also leave off erings at the shrines to the saints. Mete Hatay has also noted cases of what we would regard as re-overlapping of the Christian and Muslim religioscapes in northern Cyprus, in places where Greek Christian visitors to places from which they or their families had been driven in 1974 are reclaiming parts of abandoned churches by lighting candles in them (Constantinou et al. 2012: 180-82 ). If we pay careful attention to such low-profi le manifestations of religious behavior in places where a group has offi cially been excluded, we may well be able to see indicators of the low-key sharing of space, even after such sharing has been dissolved at offi cial levels.
Conclusion
I have utilized the concept of religioscape and the indicators of dominance to analyze the ways that spaces and places were marked as Ottoman and post-Ottoman as manifestations of interaction between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Th is analysis demonstrates the importance of linkages between local sites and wider networks of religious structures, at specifi c moments in time and through time as well. We can thus see the commonalities of the political and social processes that led to the transformation of spaces from Byzantine, thus Christian, to Ottoman, thus Muslim, and in southeastern Europe, from Ottoman to the several Christian nationalist spaces (Bulgarian, Greek, Hungarian, Serbian), on varying scales, and from the seventeenth century in Hungary to the present in Bulgaria. Th ese commonalities indicate that the term "peaceful coexistence" is misleading, as even during periods when there is little or no violence, relations of dominance are manifested in the physical structures associated with religious communities, measured against each other rather than analyzed as isolates, with the divisions reproduced through these structures as well other markers of diff erence.
From this perspective, looking at local patterns of interaction to explain coexistence is to reverse causality, because it is the placement of a local site on a religioscape, and that site's relationship to the nodes of
